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I. INTRODUCTION
Under Florida law, an individual may be convicted of solicitation if he
"commands, encourages, hires, or requests another person" to commit a
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criminal act.' An individual may also be convicted of conspiracy if that per-
son "agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person.., to
commit any offense.",2  The issue that will be examined in this article is
whether, according to Florida law, the solicitor can be convicted of both so-
licitation and conspiracy to commit a single criminal offense, or whether
double jeopardy prohibits conviction for these two crimes.
For purposes of this article, a simple hypothetical fact pattern will help
illustrate the issue. Zack hires Hunt to murder Ken.3 On that same day at
that same time, Hunt agrees to commit the murder.4 This article will address
the specific question of whether Zack can be convicted of both solicitation
and conspiracy. Moreover, if Hunt commits the murder of Ken, can Zack be
convicted of solicitation, conspiracy, and the murder? Under previous Flor-
ida cases, individuals have been convicted of both solicitation and conspiracy
to commit one substantive offense such as murder or theft.5 The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."6 The Florida Constitution also contains a double jeopardy clause stat-
ing, "[n]o person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 7
The double jeopardy clause provides "protect[ion] against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after acquittal, and against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction,"8 and "protection against 'multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense' imposed in a single proceeding." 9 Accord-
ingly, both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution pro-
hibit multiple convictions for the same act committed during a single episode
when those offenses contain identical elements.' ° The Florida Statutes re-
garding double jeopardy also contain exceptions which expand double jeop-
1. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
2. § 777.04(3).
3. This fact pattern is loosely based upon the case of Zacke v. State, 418 So. 2d 1118,
1120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
4. Id.
5. See Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Burnside
v. State, 656 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Atkinson v. State, 457 So. 2d
1063, 1063 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zacke, 418 So. 2d at 1119.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
8. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (citing Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,
498 (1984)).
9. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
10. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Florida, 894 So.
2d 941,945-46 (Fla. 2005).
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ardy prohibitions to grant further protections not provided by the United
States Constitution. 1
Part II of this article will take a look at the Florida Statutes and case
law regarding the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy. Part 11 of this arti-
cle will examine the Florida Statute that codifies the "same-elements test"
and the exceptions used to determine whether double jeopardy is an issue so
as to prevent multiple convictions for the same offense. 2 Part IV will exam-
ine Florida's double jeopardy analysis and its effect on solicitation and con-
spiracy. Moreover, since this is a prima facie case under Florida jurispru-
dence, Part V of this article will explore how other jurisdictions have dealt
with the question of whether a charge of solicitation and conspiracy should
merge for purposes of protecting individuals from multiple convictions
against double jeopardy. Part VI will then discuss how the Model Penal
Code deals with convictions and sentencing in regards to the inchoate crimes
of solicitation and conspiracy. Lastly, Part VII will conclude with a proposal
for the Florida legislature to adopt the Model Penal Code's approach to
criminal convictions of solicitation and conspiracy.
II. SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY
A. Solicitation
The basic premise of a solicitation is the "enticement" of another person
to commit a criminal offense. 3 Even if the individual who is solicited to
commit the crime never agrees to the request, the solicitor has still commit-
ted the crime of solicitation. 4 Section 777.04(2) of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides:
A person who solicits another to commit an offense prohibited by
law and in the course of such solicitation commands, encourages,
hires, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct
which would constitute such offense or an attempt to commit such
offense commits the offense of criminal solicitation, ranked for
purposes of sentencing as provided in subsection (4). 15
11. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
12. See generally Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
13. Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Hut-
chinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
14. Id. (citing State v. Waskin, 481 So. 2d 492, 493-94 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
2005]
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Florida courts have stated that "[tihe crime of solicitation is completed
when the actor with intent to do so has enticed or encouraged another to
commit a crime; the crime need not be completed."'16 Furthermore, the crime
of solicitation itself need not be violent or even involve a violent crime.
17
Since the solicitation is completed by one party simply asking another to
commit a crime, no agreement is necessary by the person solicited. 18 The
question that Florida courts have seemed to evade is what happens to the
solicitation when the solicitee agrees with the solicitor and a conspiracy has
been formed?
B. Conspiracy
Florida courts explain that "'[t]he crime of conspiracy is comprised of
the mere express or implied agreement of two or more persons to commit a
criminal offense; both the agreement and an intention to commit an offense
are essential elements."' 19 Florida statutes codifying the crime of conspiracy
state that "[a] person who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with
another person or persons to commit any offense commits the offense of
criminal conspiracy, ranked for purposes of sentencing as provided in sub-
section (4). ' '20 An individual who combines with a police officer to commit a
crime cannot be convicted of conspiracy because the officer lacks the re-
quired intent to ultimately commit the substantive offense.2 ' However, an
individual who requests a police officer to commit a crime may be convicted
of solicitation.2 E Furthermore, the object of the conspiracy for purposes of
sentencing is already factored into the guidelines providing the appropriate
punishment.23
Interestingly, a defendant in Florida has argued that a conviction for so-
licitation should merge with a conviction for conspiracy. 4 The Florida court
16. State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
an individual can be convicted of solicitation even when the person he solicits is a police
officer); see also Waskin, 481 So. 2d at 498.
17. Lopez, 864 So. 2dat 1153.
18. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1323.
19. Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Jim-
enez v. State, 715 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
20. § 777.04(3).
21. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1322-23.
22. Id. (rejecting defendant's argument that an individual cannot be convicted of solicita-
tion when the person he solicits is a police officer).
23. Crofton v. State, 491 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also §
777.04(4).
24. See Tarawneh v. State, 562 So. 2d 770, 772 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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dismissed this argument under circumstances where merger would not apply
because the conspiracy by the defendant was between himself and his co-
defendant, and the solicitation occurred with another individual.25 However,
by the court's acknowledgment of the appellant's merger theory, it is logical
to infer that they have recognized the possibility of merger under other cir-
cumstances.6 The inchoate crimes of solicitation and conspiracy, although
appearing simple at first glance, can raise complex issues.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb., 27 The Florida Constitution also contains a double jeop-
ardy clause stating, "[n]o person shall .. .be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. 2 ' The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three separate types
of protection for criminal defendants. 29  These safeguards include "pro-
tect[ion] against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
and against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction."3 °
The third "protection against 'multiple punishments for the same offense'
imposed in a single proceeding" is the most important protection for pur-
poses of this analysis.3' Both the United States Supreme Court and the Su-
preme Court of Florida prohibit multiple convictions for the same act com-
mitted during a single episode when those offenses contain identical ele-
ments.32
25. Id. In Tarawneh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the argument that
conviction for solicitation should merge with the conviction for conspiracy. Id. However, in
Tarawneh the husband's conviction for conspiracy was based on an agreement between the
husband and his wife to have a third party murdered. Id. The solicitation charge was based
upon the husband's attempted procurement of one Petrillo to commit the murder of the third
party. Id. The court's rejection of the merger theory was premised on the fact that the crimes
were committed at a different time with different actors. Tarawneh, 562 So. 2d at 772.
Therefore, there was no issue as to double jeopardy. Id.
26. See id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
29. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1989).
30. Id. at 381.
31. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
32. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Florida, 894 So.
2d 941,945 (Fla. 2005).
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A. Blockburger and the "Same-Elements" Test
The United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States ex-
plored the issue of double jeopardy and whether an individual may be pun-
ished more than once for the same offense.33 In Blockburger the defendant
was convicted of Count II for sale of morphine, Count III for sale of mor-
phine not in the original stamped package, and Count V for selling morphine
without a written order.34 Counts m and V occurred on the same day with
the same person purchasing the morphine.35 The defendant appealed and
argued that his conviction violated his protection against double jeopardy
because the morphine was only sold to one person and this constituted a sin-
gle offense. 36 The Court rejected the petitioner's first argument because his
charges for the second and third counts "although made to the same person,
were distinct and separate sales made at different times. 37 The Court also
reasoned that the legislature had intended to punish "[e]ach of several suc-
cessive sales [as] a distinct offense. 38
The Court went on to discuss Counts III and V which included sale of
narcotics not in the original stamped package and selling any of such drugs
not pursuant to a written order.39 The question was then raised whether, dur-
ing the one sale of narcotics, the individual had "committed two offenses or
only one." 4 The Court stated that the test to determine whether two offenses
had been committed "is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not."41 The Court held that a single act may be a viola-
tion of two statutes, and the petitioner's consecutive sentences were upheld.42
The test created by Blockburger has been commonly referred to in Florida as
the "same-elements" test43 and has been codified under section 775.021(4) of
the Florida Statutes."
33. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-02.
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
39. Id. at 303-04.
40. Id. at 304.
41. Id. (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
42. Id. (citing Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 342).
43. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 2001).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (2004).
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B. Section 775.021(4) of the Florida Statutes
Under Florida law, the courts will examine the legislative intent to de-
termine whether multiple convictions for different crimes occurring during a
single criminal transaction can be upheld.45 When the legislative intent is not
clear, the courts will apply the "same-elements" test as set forth in Block-
burger.46 Florida has codified the Blockburger test in section 775.021(4) of
the Florida Statutes.4 7 This statute also provides several exceptions to the
"same-elements" test that enhance double jeopardy protections for individu-
als facing criminal conviction.41 Section 775.021(4)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes provides:
Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, com-
mits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal of-
fenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced
separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may or-
der the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the
purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense re-
quires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to
the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.49
Florida cases apparently have yet to apply this test to the inchoate offenses of
solicitation and conspiracy when both occur during one criminal episode.50
However, section 775.021(4) is consistently applied in cases dealing with
double jeopardy issues.51
1. Overview of Section 775.021(4) and Exceptions: State v. Florida
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Florida provided a helpful over-
view of how to apply the provisions of section 775.021(4) of the Florida
45. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla. 2005).
46. Id.
47. See § 775.021(4).
48. See § 775.021(4)(b)(1)-(3).
49. § 775.021(4)(a) (emphasis added).
50. See Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Burnside
v. State, 656 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Atkinson v. State, 457 So. 2d
1063, 1063 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zacke v.State, 418 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
51. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 2005) (finding that the conviction of
both aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and attempted second degree murder
arising from one bullet shot by the defendant into the officer's head did not violate double
jeopardy).
2005]
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Statutes." The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Florida was faced with
the question of whether an individual can be convicted of aggravated battery
on a police officer and attempted second-degree murder with a firearm aris-
ing from a single criminal act by the defendant of firing a bullet and hitting a
police officer.53 On its face, the case appeared to be a clear cut violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights protected under the double jeopardy
clause.54 However, the court held that the defendant's conviction of at-
tempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery on a law enforcement
officer did not violate double jeopardy, and consecutive sentences under sec-
tion 775.021(4) were proper.5
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The defendant, dur-
ing a single criminal episode, shot a police officer in the head with a hand-
gun.56 The jury came back with a verdict under Count VI as guilty of aggra-
vated battery on a law enforcement officer and guilty on Count VII for at-
tempted second-degree murder with a firearm.57 During sentencing, "defense
counsel moved to vacate the conviction on" double jeopardy grounds alleg-
ing that the convictions were for "the same exact conduct."5 8 The trial court
then withheld sentencing on Count VI but sentenced the defendant to life
imprisonment on Count VII. 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
per curiam and without an opinion.60 However, when the defendant asserted
post-conviction relief on double jeopardy grounds, the Fourth District re-
versed and vacated the conviction on Count VI. 6' The Supreme Court of
Florida granted de novo review of the case on a motion for post-conviction
relief.
62
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the State's contention that
attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery on a law enforce-
ment officer contained elements distinct from one another.63 The court nar-
rowly applied the "same-elements" test and found that "[v]ictim contact is
52. Id. at 944-49.
53. Id. at 944.
54. See Lovell v. State, 882 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
dual convictions satisfying the "same-elements" test may still violate double jeopardy protec-
tions when the offenses are "degree variants of the same core offense").
55. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 949.
56. Id. at 944.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 944 (citing Florida v. State, 701 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
61. Id. (citing Florida v. State, 855 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
62. Id. at 944-45.
63. Id. at 946.
[Vol. 30:1:183
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unnecessary for attempted second-degree murder but essential to aggravated
battery, and unlike attempted second-degree murder, an act need not have
had the potential to cause death to constitute aggravated battery." 64 The
court then examined the exceptions under section 775.021(4)(b) which pro-
vides:
The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each
criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode
or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in
subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this
rule of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided
by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of
which are subsumed by the greater offense.
65
Applying the exceptions provided under this statute is a complex task.66 The
Supreme Court of Florida quickly dismissed the "identical elements" excep-
tion under section 775.021(4)(b)(1), explaining that proof of attempted sec-
ond-degree murder requires the state to prove the defendant's act could have
caused death where as aggravated battery does not require this proof.
67
The court also went on to analyze the application of section
775.021(4)(b)(2) which bars a dual conviction for "[o]ffenses which are de-
grees of the same offense as provided by statute. 68 The test under this ex-
ception looks to see whether the crimes committed during the single criminal
episode are done toward the same "core offense. 69 In determining if both
crimes have the same "core offense," the court will look to see what the pri-
mary evil is of the crime that has been committed.70 If the two offenses con-
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
66. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 2001).
67. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 947-48.
68. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
69. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 948. In Johnson v. State, the defendant had stolen a purse that
contained a firearm and a certain amount of cash. 597 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 1992). He was
separately convicted of grand theft of cash and grand theft of a firearm. Id. The court of
appeals reversed on double jeopardy grounds because both takings occurred during one crimi-
nal taking. Id.
70. See Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J. dissenting) ("The
primary evil of aggravated battery is that it inflicts physical injury on the victim; [and that] the
primary evil of attempted homicide is that it may inflict death .... "); Lovell v. State, 882 So.
2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a conviction for first degree felony
2005]
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tain the same "primary evil," no dual conviction will withstand double jeop-
ardy protection.7' Because the "primary evil" of aggravated battery is the
infliction of bodily harm, and the "primary evil" of attempted murder is the
possibility of killing the victim, both crimes are not derived from the same
"core offense. 72 In Florida, the court followed precedent 73 and held that
aggravated battery and attempted murder were "not merely degree variants
of the same core offense, and therefore [did] not come within the [statutory]
exception."74
Next, the court analyzed the last exception to the Blockburger test as
codified under the Florida Statutes. Section 775.021(4)(b)(3) of the Florida
Statutes bars dual convictions for two separate crimes when one of the of-
fenses is the lesser offense, "the statutory elements of which are subsumed
by the greater offense. 75 However, the court in Florida made clear that this
subsection only applies "to necessarily lesser included offenses listed in
Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses. 76 In other words,
"necessarily lesser included offenses are those in which the elements of the
lesser offense are always subsumed within the greater, without regard to the
charging document or evidence at trial. '77 The court also discussed the dif-
ference between necessarily lesser included offenses and permissive included
offenses.78 The permissive lesser included offense is fact specific where both
crimes appear different on the face of the statute; but in this particular case,
one crime cannot be committed unless the other has been perpetrated. 79 The
court, in applying the necessarily lesser included offense exception, found
that dual convictions for aggravated battery on a police officer and attempted
second-degree murder did not violate double jeopardy protections since ag-
gravated battery is not a necessarily lesser included offense under Category 1
of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses.8° Judging from the court's
opinion in this case, the double jeopardy protections under Florida law are
murder and aggravated manslaughter of one person violated double jeopardy because the
statutes are designed to punish the same evil of a criminal act leading to death).
71. See Johnson, 597 So. 2d at 799.
72. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 23-24 (Fla. 2001).
73. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 949 (Fla. 2005) (citing Gordon, 780 So. 2d at 23).
74. Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(3) (2004).
76. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 947.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923, 925 n.2 (Fla. 1991)).
80. Id.
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narrow, and the application of section 775.021(4) of the Florida Statutes can
be cumbersome."
2. The Single Criminal Episode
Another issue important to double jeopardy analysis under Florida law
is the length of one criminal episode. When does a single criminal transac-
tion end and another begin? The court appears to have taken a very narrow
view of timing for a single criminal episode, almost insuring multiple pun-
ishments.82 The Supreme Court of Florida in Hayes v. State 3 settled con-
flicting law among the First, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.84
The question presented in Hayes was "whether a defendant may be sepa-
rately convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle
where the defendant steals various items from inside a victim's residence,
including the victim's car keys, and then proceeds outside the victim's resi-
dence to steal the victim's motor vehicle utilizing those keys. '85 After being
"convicted of armed robbery, armed burglary of a structure, and grand theft
of a motor vehicle, ' 86 Hayes appealed, arguing that because the acts stemmed
from one criminal episode, "double jeopardy prohibited [multiple] convic-
tions for both of these offenses because they are degree variants of the core
offense of theft." 87
The court in Hayes then discussed the conflict between the First District
and the Fifth District.88 In Henderson v. State,89 the First District upheld
multiple convictions for robbery and grand theft of an automobile on sub-
stantially similar facts to that of Hayes, which states that the "the robbery...
was sufficiently separated... by both time and geography." 90 The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in another case with facts indistinguishable from
Hayes, concluded that because the robbery and theft of the automobile oc-
curred during one continuous sequence of events and was the "product of the
same force and fear," dual convictions had to be reversed. 9' The Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the Fifth District's analysis and went on to rule that
81. See generally Florida, 894 So. 2d at 941 (Fla. 2005).
82. See Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2001).
83. Id. at 695.
84. Id. at 705.
85. Id. at 697.
86. Id.
87. Hayes, 803 So.2d at 698.
88. Id.
89. 778 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
90. Id. at 1047.
91. Castlebury v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231, 1231-32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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the defendant may be convicted and consecutively sentenced to robbery and
grand theft of an automobile.92 The court established that in determining
double jeopardy issues resulting from stealing one victim's personal belong-
ings,
courts should look to whether there was a separation of time,
place, or circumstances between the initial armed robbery and the
subsequent grand theft, as those factors are objective criteria util-
ized to determine whether there are distinct and independent
criminal acts or whether there is one continuous criminal act with a
single criminal intent.9
3
The court reasoned that the defendant, Hayes, first entered the home of
the victim and robbed him of many personal items.94 This ended the rob-
bery. 95 Second, the defendant then went on to separately steal the victim's
automobile. 96 The court in Hayes recognized the criminal acts of the defen-
dant as "sufficiently separated as to time and place so as to constitute distinct
and independent criminal acts." 97 Applying the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Florida in both Florida and Hayes, a valid argument can be made
that a conviction for solicitation and conspiracy occurring at the same time,
with the same criminal object should be barred under double jeopardy analy-
sis.98
IV. APPLYING FLORIDA'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS TO SOLICITATION
AND CONSPIRACY
A. "Same-Elements" Test
To determine whether multiple convictions for solicitation and conspir-
acy arising out of one criminal episode violate a defendant's protection
against double jeopardy, the courts will first explore whether the legislature
intended separate punishments. 9 Absent clear legislative intent to allow for
multiple punishments for two separate crimes, courts will apply the Block-
92. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704-05.
93. Id. at 704.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704.
98. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 949 (Fla. 2005); Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704-05.
99. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 2001) (citing M.P. v. State, 682 So. 2d 79, 81
(Fla. 1996)).
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burger test, which the Florida Legislature later codified in section
775.021(4)(a).'O° According to the Florida Statutes codification of the
Blockburger "same-elements" test, an individual may be convicted of multi-
ple crimes when "in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, [he or
she] commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal
offenses."'0 ' To determine whether an offense is separate for double jeop-
ardy purposes, each offense must contain "an element that the other does
not."'1 2 It is relatively clear that the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy
will not pass the "same-elements test" under section 775.021(4)(a) of the
Florida Statutes.'03 The crime of solicitation under the Florida Statutes pun-
ishes the individual who "commands, encourages, hires, or requests another
person" to commit a crime."°4 The crime of conspiracy punishes "[a] person
who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person ... to
commit [an] offense" prohibited by law.'0 5 Clearly, the crime of solicitation
does not require the element of an "agreement" to commit the crime.' °6 Fur-
thermore, the crime of conspiracy does not require the element of one indi-
vidual encouraging or requesting the other to commit the offense.0 7 Since
solicitation and conspiracy are two separate crimes under the "same-
elements" test, which therefore does not prohibit separate convictions of
each, it is necessary to review the exceptions listed under section
775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes.10 8 Multiple convictions are barred "if
the offenses meet the criteria in [any] one of the exceptions."'09
100. Id. at 19-20; see FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(a) (2004).
101. § 775.021(4)(a).
102. Id.
103. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2)-(3) (2004).
104. § 777.04(2).
105. § 777.04(3).
106. § 777.04(2); Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that the crime of solicitation is complete when the solicitor asks another person to
commit a crime); see also State v. Waskin, 481 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that a solicitation is complete when one person encourages another person to commit
a crime).
107. § 777.04(3); see also Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (explaining that "the crime of solicitation need not be included in a conspiracy, which
may be brought about by the cooperative planning of participants where no one co-conspirator
requested the other to become involved").
108. § 775.021(4)(b).
109. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Fla. 2005).
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B. Identical Elements of Proof
The next issue under the analysis requires a review of the illustration
provided in the introduction of this article. Zack hires Hunt to kill Ken and
at that same time and location, Hunt agrees to commit the murder. The first
exception under section 775.021(4)(b)(1) of the Florida Statutes bars multi-
ple convictions for offenses occurring during one criminal episode that "re-
quire identical elements of proof."' 1 ° Here, the only proof needed to sustain
the charge against Zack for conspiracy would be the fact that Hunt agreed."'
Moreover, the proof needed to find Zack guilty of solicitation would be the
fact that he requested or hired Hunt to commit the murder. 12 The identical
elements of proof exception is not easy to overcome and is very similar to
the "same-elements" test; however, even if the two crimes fail to meet this
test, the other exceptions must still be analyzed." 3
C. Primary Evil and Degree Variant
The second provision under section 775.021(4)(b)(2) of the Florida
Statutes provides an exception for "[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same
offense as provided by statute."'" 4 To fulfill this exception, the defendant
must prove that the crimes committed were "'aggravated forms of the same
underlying offense distinguished only by degree factors.""' 5 The Supreme
Court of Florida in Gordon v. State used a two-step analysis to see whether
two criminal acts committed during a single criminal episode would fall
within exception two of section 775.021(4)(a) of Florida Statutes."6 The
first question is whether the two crimes constitute separate offenses under the
Blockburger "same-elements" test."7 The next inquiry is "whether the
crimes are 'degree variants' or aggravated forms of the same core of-
110. § 775.021(4)(b)(1).
111. See § 777.04(3).
112. See § 777.04(2).
113. See Lovell v. State, 882 So. 2d 1107, 1108-09 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The
court applied the identical elements of proof test to conclude that to convict for felony murder
the state need only prove that the victim died during the commission of a felony, while aggra-
vated manslaughter needs proof that the death resulted from negligently failing to get the
victim medical attention. Id. at 1109. The court ultimately found that the two crimes fell
within another exception and reversed part of the conviction. Id.
114. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
115. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d
153, 154 (Fla. 1994)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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fense.""' 8  As previously discussed, there is no doubt that solicitation to
commit murder and conspiracy to commit murder, are two separate crimes
under the "same-elements" test."9 For purposes of double jeopardy, the ar-
gument must now be made that solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy
to commit murder occurred during one criminal episode, and "are merely
degree variants of the [same] core offense." 120
According to Hayes, and referring to the illustration of Zack's hiring
Hunt to kill Ken, it is clear that the offenses of solicitation and conspiracy
committed by Zack both occurred during one criminal episode.' 2' As previ-
ously mentioned, Hayes examined "whether there was a separation of time,
place, or circumstances" between the two crimes to determine "whether there
are distinct and independent criminal acts or whether there is one continuous
criminal act with a single criminal intent."' 22 In the case of Zack's hiring
Hunt to commit murder, there is no separation of "time, place, or circum-
stances" between the request by Zack and the subsequent agreement by Hunt
to commit the offense.123 Furthermore, both of these acts occurred during
"one continuous criminal act with a single criminal intent." ' 24 Zack needs
only to command, encourage, hire, or request Hunt to commit a crime to
have committed solicitation. 125 At that same time, and without any further
act or intent on behalf of Zack, Hunt simply needs to agree to the scheme for
Zack to have committed not only solicitation, but conspiracy as well. 26 Hav-
ing established in this illustration that the crimes were committed during one
118. Id.
119. See id. at 20; see also FLA. STAT § 777.04(2)-(3) (2004) (stating solicitation includes
a request, or encouragement, where criminal conspiracy only requires an agreement to commit
an offense proscribed by the law).
120. Sirmons, 634 So. 2d at 154 (reversing conviction of grand theft of an automobile and
armed robbery with a weapon because both crimes are merely degree variants of the core
offense of theft and both occurred during one criminal transaction); see also State v. Florida,
894 So. 2d 941, 948-49 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting argument that aggravated battery is a degree
variant of attempted murder); Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 2001); Mixson v.
State, 857 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that two counts of grand
theft must be struck down because they are part of the same core offense of theft and occurred
during one criminal episode).
121. See Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704 (finding that criminal episodes are separated by time,
place, and circumstance).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
126. See § 777.04(2)-(3).
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criminal episode, the issue remaining to be resolved is whether solicitation
and conspiracy are "degree variants" of part of the same core offense.'27
Florida courts have used the "primary evil test" to determine whether
separate crimes are "degree variants" of the same "core offense."'128 Accord-
ing to State v. Florida, the court looks at the potential harm that the criminal
act will or may cause as a result. 129 Under this test, the "primary evil" of a
solicitation is that an individual will request, encourage, or hire another to
commit an offense with the potential that the other individual will agree,
although it is not necessary for there to be an agreement. 3 ° Furthermore, the
"primary evil" of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more people to
commit a criminal offense.13' Under this analysis, it would appear that the
solicitation would be a lesser "degree variant" of the "core offense" of con-
spiracy to commit murder because both are punishing the potential for an
agreement or actual agreement that may result in the solicitation becoming a
conspiracy.'32 The argument for double jeopardy protection of an individual
convicted of solicitation and conspiracy to commit a crime, arising during
one criminal episode, may find its chances under the "degree variant" excep-
tion in section 775.021(4)(b)(2) of the Florida Statutes.'33
D. Lesser Offense Subsumed by the Greater Offense
The most persuasive double jeopardy argument which would ultimately
bar dual convictions for a solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy to
commit murder, arising during one criminal transaction, will likely be found
in the exception listed under section 775.021(4)(b)(3) of the Florida Stat-
utes. 34 The third provision under section 775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Stat-
utes grants exception to "[o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory
elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.' 35  The court in
127. See FLA. STAT § 775.021(4)(b)(2) (2004); State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 948 (Fla.
2005).
128. See, e.g., Florida, 894 So. 2d at 948-49.
129. Id. at 948-49 (finding that the primary evil of battery is intentional, nonconsensual
touching, and the primary evil of attempted second-degree murder is the potential of the de-
fendant's act to cause death).
130. See § 777.04(2); State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (stating that "solicitation is completed by one party asking another" with no agreement
or action required by the second party).
131. See § 777.04(3).
132. See § 777.04(2)-(3); Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1994).
133. FLA. STAT § 775.021(4)(b)(2) (2004).
134. § 775.021(4)(b)(3).
135. Id.
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Florida explained that this exception only applies "to necessarily lesser in-
cluded offenses listed in Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Of-
fenses."'136 Accordingly, a review of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases provides that neither solicitation nor conspiracy have any
necessarily lesser included offenses listed within their jury instruction.'37
Moreover, Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses lo-
cated in the appendix of the jury instructions also fails to mention either so-
licitation or conspiracy.'38 An argument to include solicitation as a necessar-
ily lesser included offense of conspiracy is not an easy obstacle to overcome.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Ray v. State3 9 has confirmed that the Cate-
gory 1 "schedule is presumptively correct and complete, and the Court ex-
pects that using the schedule will lessen the confusion surrounding lesser
included offenses."' 4 To succeed under this exception, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that Category One of the Schedule of Lesser In-
cluded Offenses is complete and argue that solicitation is a necessarily lesser
included offense to conspiracy.
An argument to include solicitation as a lesser included offense to con-
spiracy is not without merit. Arguments have been made that a solicitation
can also be referred to as an attempted conspiracy.14' In Hutchinson v. State,
the appellant requested a man by the name of Pledger to kill one Dutch
Thomas. 42 Pledger then "reported the incident to the State Attorney's of-
fice."'143 The appellant was convicted of attempted conspiracy, and on appeal
the question was raised whether attempted conspiracy was recognized as a
crime under Florida law.' 44 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed
the conviction, holding that attempted conspiracy was not a crime and a
136. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 947 (Fla. 2005) (finding that aggravated battery is
not a necessarily lesser included offense of attempted murder recorded under Category One of
the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses).
137. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 5.2, 5.3 (4th ed.
2002).
138. Id. at609.
139. 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981).
140. Id. at 961 n.7.
141. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 547-49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02 cmt. 1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments
1985) (explaining that "[s]olicitation may... be thought of as an attempt to conspire").
142. Hutchinson, 315 So. 2d at 547.
143. Id.
144. Id. It should be noted that at the time the appellant was convicted, the crime of solici-
tation was not codified but would have to be charged under the crime of common law solicita-
tion under section 775.01 of the 1973 Florida Statutes. Id. This statute made "common law
[crimes] of England in relation to crimes applicable in Florida." Id.
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charge of solicitation would be proper.'45 However, the court did concede to
the proposition that, theoretically, a solicitation is the equivalent to attempted
conspiracy." The law is well-established that an individual who succeeds in
the commission of a crime may not be convicted of both the criminal attempt
and the substantive offense.'4 7 Theoretically, because a solicitation is tanta-
mount to the non-existent crime of attempted conspiracy, an argument could
be made that once the solicitee agrees with the solicitor's proposition then
the object of the solicitation has been completed and would therefore merge
into the conspiracy.'48 In this case, if a jury were to convict the solicitor of
conspiracy, then the lesser offense of solicitation, or theoretically an at-
tempted conspiracy, would be "absorbed by the greater offense."'49
Furthermore, one Florida court has recognized that punishment for so-
licitation is already factored into the sentencing for a conviction of conspir-
acy. 50 In Crofton v. State,'51 the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the trial court departed from the recommended sentencing guidelines and the
case was reversed and remanded.'52 Geraldine Crofton, the defendant, ar-
ranged for her husband to be murdered by seeking out the help of one Vance
Ellison.153 Crofton actively provided information to plan the murder while
Ellison subsequently hired two other individuals to commit the murder.'54
Crofton was later convicted of conspiracy to commit the murder of her hus-
band and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.115  On appeal, Crofton
argued that her conviction had exceeded the recommended sentencing pro-
vided in Florida guidelines. 56 The court reversed the sentence because "the
trial judge improperly considered factors inherent in the underlying crime to
justify departure."'' 57 The Second District Court of Appeal further noted that
"[t]he [lower] court also saw aggravation in the fact that Geraldine solicited
Ellison to commit the murder."' 58 The court then explained that solicitation
145. Hutchinson, 315 So. 2d at 549.
146. Id.
147. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 375 (3d ed. 2001).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Crofton v. State, 491 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
151. Id. at317.
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id. at 318.
154. Id.
155. Crofton, 491 So. 2d at 318.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 319. The trial judge improperly considered the fact that the object of the con-
spiracy was murder and that this was already factored into the sentencing guidelines. Id. at
320.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
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to commit murder "is in the very nature of the charge of conspiracy to com-
mit murder and is already factored into the sentencing guidelines."' 9 The
case was sent back to the lower court for resentencing.' 6 According to Crof-
ton, it would appear that punishment for solicitation to commit murder is
already factored into the punishment for conspiracy. 16' Accordingly, solicita-
tion should be a necessarily lesser included offense to conspiracy, thus bar-
ring multiple convictions. 62 Other jurisdictions have dealt with the complex
case of double jeopardy analysis for solicitation and conspiracy and may be
helpful insight as to whether an argument to bar multiple convictions will be
successful.1
63
V. JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
A. Michigan Rejects Double Jeopardy Argument
In Michigan, the issue of whether double jeopardy prohibits multiple
convictions for the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy arising during one
criminal transaction has been raised."6 The case of People v. Jones was de-
cided in an unpublished opinion on March 22, 2005.165 In Jones, the defen-
dant was convicted and sentenced to nineteen to thirty years imprisonment
for solicitation and second-degree murder, and he also received life impris-
onment on a conspiracy count."6 On appeal, the defendant argued that his
convictions violated both federal and state protections against double jeop-
ardy. 67 Similar to the Florida double jeopardy analysis, the Court of Ap-
peals first determined the legislative intent in permitting multiple punish-
ments. 68 However, unlike Florida, the Michigan courts believe "[s]tatutes
prohibiting conduct violative of distinct social norms are generally viewed as
separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments.' ' 69 The Court of
Appeals then explained that "the purpose of the conspiracy statute is to pro-
159. Corfton, 491 So. 2d at 320.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 319-20.
163. See, e.g., People v. Jones, No. 250326, 2005 WL 657578 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2005); State v. Vallejos, 9 P.3d 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d
814 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
164. See Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *4-5; Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 825.
165. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id. (citing People v. Pena, 569 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)).
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tect society from the increased danger presented by group activity as opposed
to individual activity."' 7 ° The court then found that the purpose of the solici-
tation statute was to punish those people who try to induce others into com-
mitting a criminal act. 7' The court held that since the statutes were aimed at
two separate and distinct social norms, conviction for each crime "[did] not
offend double jeopardy principles."' 72 Lastly, the court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that convictions of both solicitation and conspiracy should
be barred because each required proof of the same evidence. 73 This test is
similar to Florida's double jeopardy statute, which exempts those crimes
which require identical elements of proof, thus barring multiple convic-
tions.'74 However, the Supreme Court of Michigan has rejected the adoption
of this test, so the Court of Appeals would not apply an analysis.'75
In Jones, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in coming to their conclusion,
cited the case of People v. Burgess. 76 It should be noted that the court in
Burgess recognized that under double jeopardy there is "a close question...
where ... [a] defendant is convicted of inciting, inducing or exhorting an-
other to commit murder in addition to conspiracy and first-degree murder."'
' 77
This analysis appears misplaced. The Burgess court came to the conclusion
that the intent of the legislature was to punish the solicitation and conspiracy
separately. 78 However, the statute which proscribes solicitation was earlier
found to be "a special kind of accomplice statute," 179 which stated "[a]ny
person who incites, induces or exhorts any other person to unlawfully ...
murder ... shall be punished in the same manner as if he had committed the
offense."' 80 Nonetheless, the court found that the statute was meant to codify
common law crime of solicitation and ultimately upheld the defendant's mul-
tiple convictions. 8' The conclusion in this analysis relied on the legislature's
intent in establishing statutes that were meant to punish individuals for sepa-
rate crimes. 82 Another jurisdiction analyzed a similar "inciting" statute to
170. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *4 (citing People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901, 913
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d 814, 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Pena, 569 N.W.2d at 875).
173. Id.
174. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(1) (2004).
175. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *5.
176. Id. (citing People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d 814, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
177. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 823.
178. Id. at 824.
179. Id. at 823 (citing People v. Rehkopf, 370 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Mich. 1985)).
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 824.
182. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 824.
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the one analyzed in Burgess and came to a different conclusion as to whether
an individual can be convicted of solicitation, conspiracy, and the substantive
offense of murder.'83
B. New Mexico: One Last Defense
In the case of State v. Vallejos, the New Mexico Court of Appeals re-
versed the defendant's convictions for solicitation and conspiracy." 4 In
Vallejos, the defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder and solicitation to commit murder, arguing that the mul-
tiple punishments violated his protection against double jeopardy. 85 The
state secured a conviction on the fact that the defendant had solicited and
conspired with his nephew, Chris Sedillo, to shoot and kill Sybil Saiz. 86 The
criminal plan was executed; however, the victim, Ms. Saiz, survived. 87 The
defendant was formally adjudicated as guilty of both solicitation and con-
spiracy, but the court imposed concurrent sentences for the dual convic-
tions. 88 The defendant then argued that the merger of the two offenses for
sentencing purposes was in contradiction to his right against double jeop-
ardy.' 89 As a result, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the legislature
intended multiple convictions for crimes relating to a solicitation.'9"
The court first explained that in a prior case, it determined that the
crimes of solicitation and conspiracy merge for purposes of sentencing and
the defendant may only receive a concurrent sentence for the two crimes.' 9'
The court of appeals then stated that "imposition of concurrent sentences did
not render multiple convictions for the same offense harmless," and that "be-
sides habitual liability, other potential adverse collateral consequences flow
from allowing a separate conviction to stand, including delay in the defen-
dant's eligibility for parole, the use of the second conviction for impeach-
ment purposes, and general social stigma."'' 92 The court then concluded that
the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder may be prose-
cuted and submitted to a jury which can render a verdict on both counts. 193
183. See State v. Vallejos, 9 P.3d 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
184. Id. at 670.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 674.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Swafford v. State, 810 P.2d 1223, 1234 (N.M. 1991)).
191. Id. at 675 (citing State v. Shade, 726 P.2d 864, 878 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)).
192. Id. (citing State v. Pierce, 792 P.2d 408, 419 (N.M. 1990)).
193. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 675-76.
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However, the court held that the "[d]efendant will not be held 'liable' or
'guilty' of criminal solicitation upon formal adjudication or entry of judg-
ment and sentence by the trial court."'94 Thus, the court vacated the convic-
tion for criminal solicitation.' 95 Analyzing the Florida Statutes codifying
solicitation and conspiracy in light of Florida's accomplice liability statute
may prove to be one last defense in barring multiple convictions for the two
inchoate offenses. 1
96
C. Applying the New Mexico Approach
The New Mexico statute construed in Vallejos was substantially differ-
ent from the Florida statute that punishes criminal solicitation.1 97 The prob-
lems that arose in Vallejos were the statutes "incongruous provisions" cou-
pled with the fact that the statute also combined accomplice liability with the
inchoate crime of solicitation. 98 The New Mexico Court of Appeals was
forced to interpret these provisions strictly and with the principle of lenity
due to the nature of the crimes.' 99 The principle of lenity "requires [the
court] to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant."' ° According to sec-
tion 775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, "[t]he intent of the Legislature is
to convict and sentence for each criminal offense" and "not to allow the prin-
ciple of lenity. ''20' Furthermore, it appears that the legislature intended pun-
ishment for accomplice liability and solicitation separately. Section 777.011
of the Florida Statutes which describes the "[p]rincipal in first degree," or
aider and abettor, is only related to the solicitation statute in that they both
are contained under chapter 777 of the Florida Statutes. °2 However, an ar-
gument can be made regarding the construction of the solicitation statute and
accomplice statute which may require prohibition of multiple punishments.
A "[p]rincipal in the first degree" can be convicted and punished for a
substantive offense if he or she "aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise
procures such offense to be committed. ''20 3 The use of the word "hires" in
both the accomplice liability statute and the solicitation statute may provide
194. Id. at 676 (citing State v. Mondragon, 759 P.2d 1003, 1006 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.021 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 777.011 (2004).
197. Compare FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004), with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-28-3(D) (Lex-
isNexis 1978).
198. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 675.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing State v. Odgen, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (N.M. 1994)).
201. FLA. STAT § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
202. See FLA. STAT §§ 777.011, 777.04(2) (2004).
203. § 777.011 (emphasis added).
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double jeopardy protection when the substantive crime is committed.2 4 An
argument can be made that Zack can only be convicted of murder in this
instance because Zack's guilt of solicitation and the substantive offense of
murder would rely on the same proof of him "hiring" Hunt, and, therefore,
would fall within the statutory exception barring dual convictions.2 °5
It is clear that some bright-line rule regarding these offenses and the
convictions thereof should be established and adopted by Florida. Professors
and legal scholars of the American Law Institute may have created a solution
to double jeopardy issues arising out of multiple convictions for solicitation
and conspiracy.20 6
VI. THE MODEL PENAL CODE: SOLICITATION, CONSPIRACY, AND
COMPLICITY
The Model Penal Code (MPC) and states that have adopted similar pe-
nal statutes have taken a different approach to the inchoate offenses of solici-
tation and conspiracy. 27 According to section 5.02 of the MPC:
A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the pur-
pose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands,
encourages or requests another person to engage in specific con-
duct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such
crime or would establish his complicity in its commission or at-
208tempted commission.
The basic language of this statute is very similar to that of section
777.04(2) of the Florida Statutes.2°9 The MPC also provides that a defendant
is still guilty of criminal solicitation even if the actor failed to communicate
the solicitation to another person, so long as his behavior was indicative of a
command, encouragement or request.
21°
204. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla. 2005) (stating that legislative intent is
determinative in double jeopardy cases); § 775.021(4)(b)(1) (barring dual convictions for
crimes requiring the same elements of proof).
205. See § 775.021(4)(b)(1).
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 5.02(2)-(3), 5.05(3) cmt. I (Official
Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
207. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 5.02(1), 5.03(1); see also Commonwealth
v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198, 1198 (Pa. 1986) (finding that an individual may not be convicted of
solicitation and conspiracy if both inchoate offenses are designed towards the commission of
one substantive offense).
208. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02(1).
209. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
210. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02(1).
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The MPC's statute regarding conspiracy is also very similar to Florida's
statute. According to section 5.03(1) of the MPC:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or
more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or
an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com-
mit such crime. t '
Under both the MPC and Florida law, an agreement to commit some criminal
act is a necessary element of conspiracy.212 In addition, unlike Florida law,
the MPC requires that at least one of the co-conspirators commit some overt
act to prove the alleged conspiracy exists.21 3
However, a difference between Florida law and the MPC that is impor-
tant for purposes of this article regards multiple convictions. Accordingly, in
defining the law of solicitation and conspiracy, the MPC provides that "[a]
person may not be convicted of more than one offense defined by this Article
for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the
same crime., 214 Indeed, the MPC reasons that the danger of inchoate crimes
is that they may result in the crime being committed, and, therefore, "there is
no warrant for cumulating convictions of ... solicitation and conspiracy to
commit the same offense. 21 5 Applying the provisions of the MPC to the
illustration of Zack hiring Hunt to kill Ken, Zack will only be guilty of one
inchoate crime, either conspiracy or solicitation, since the inchoate offense is
of "conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the
same crime. 2t 6 Furthermore, the MPC provides that a person may not be
convicted of both an inchoate crime and the substantive offense which was
its object.2 17 Thus, under the MPC, if Hunt murders Ken, Zack will be guilty
211. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.03(1).
212. See id.; § 777.04(3).
213. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.03(5).
214. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05(3).
215. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05 cmt. 4.
216. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05(3).
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(l)(b) (Official Draft & Explanatory Notes 1985).
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of murder and punished accordingly, but will not be guilty of either solicita-
tion or conspiracy.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
Florida criminal law providing punishment for the crimes of solicitation
and conspiracy not only raises double jeopardy issues, but also poses a dan-
ger to the efficiency of the Florida criminal justice system. Currently, a jury
can convict an individual of both solicitation and conspiracy that is designed
to culminate into one substantive criminal offense.21 8 An argument that so-
licitation is a lesser included offense or a "degree variant" of conspiracy may
ultimately bar dual convictions under Florida law. However, it appears that
the MPC takes the appropriate view that punishment "should certainly suf-
fice to meet whatever danger is presented by the actor," and the "heaviest
and most afflictive sanctions" should be reserved for the substantive
219
crimes.
It is questionable whether imposing numerous punishments on an indi-
vidual for inchoate crimes which were meant to culminate in the commission
of one substantive offense will act as a deterrent. 20 Furthermore, the Florida
Legislature must enact law that will efficiently "determine under what cir-
cumstances consecutive punishment is to be authorized for the various com-
binations of offenses that arise from unitary conduct. 22 ' To clear up any
confusion raising double jeopardy issues, over-sentencing problems, and
overall efficiency of the Florida criminal law system regarding punishment
for inchoate crimes such as solicitation and conspiracy, the Florida Legisla-
ture should adopt similar provisions to those provided under the Model Penal
Code. However, without such legislation the double jeopardy argument to
bar dual convictions for solicitation and conspiracy designed to achieve one
criminal offense will await its day in court.
218. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 5.2, 5.3 (2002).
219. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05 cmt. 2 (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985).
220. See id.
221. Kevin A. Hicks, Note, A Proposal for Legislative Effectuation of Double Jeopardy
Protection, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 693 (1990).
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